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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Gregory Wayne Powell challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the 
statements he made during a pre-parole interview and parole board hearing, and their fruits, 
because they were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.  As 
explained in his appellant’s brief, he faced a classic penalty situation during the parole process 
because he either had to incriminate himself or spend another nine years in prison.   
In response, the State asserted that Mr. Powell could not claim a Fifth Amendment 
violation because he “chose” to participate in the parole process; argued that Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272 (1998), controlled, even though that adverse inference case 
is not relevant to this penalty case; relied on the plurality opinion in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 
49 (2002), as if it were the Court’s holding (it is not); and asserted that Mr. Powell had waived 
an “argument” which is in reality an undisputed matter of fact which the State itself conceded 
below.   
After the State filed its respondent’s brief, the Idaho Supreme Court suspended the 
briefing schedule in this case pending its decision in State v. Van Komen, 376 P.3d 738 (2016).   
Van Komen ultimately held that the district court violated Van Komen’s Fifth Amendment rights 
when it relinquished jurisdiction because he did not take a polygraph test that may have 
incriminated him.  Id. at 744.   
As explained below, Van Komen disposes of many of the State’s arguments and dictates 
the outcome here.  Van Komen adopted the same reasoning that Mr. Powell put forth in his 
appellant’s brief (which was premised almost entirely on well-established U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent), while rejecting the reasoning suggested here by the State (which amounted to a clear 
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misreading of those cases).  The State’s remaining arguments likewise rest on its 
misunderstanding of U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the record in this case.  Because 
Mr. Powell’s statements were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination, this Court should vacate his judgment of conviction, reverse the order denying his 
motion to suppress, and remand to the district court. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Powell’s motion to suppress because the statements 
used against him were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Powell’s Motion To Suppress Because The 
Statements Used Against Him Were Taken In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Right Against 
Self-Incrimination 
 
A. According To The Idaho Supreme Court’s Reasoning In Van Komen, Mr. Powell’s 
Statements Were Taken In Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights And Should Be 
Suppressed 
 
 The parties in this case filed the appellant’s and respondent’s briefs after the Court of 
Appeals decided State v. Van Komen, No. 41916, 2015 WL 7785342 (Ct. App. Dec. 4, 2015) 
(concluding that, because Van Komen did not have a liberty interest in probation, the district 
court did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights when it relinquished jurisdiction because he 
refused to participate in a polygraph).  After the Idaho Supreme Court granted review in Van 
Komen, it suspended the briefing schedule in this case.  On review, the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that the district court violated Van Komen’s Fifth Amendment rights when it relinquished 
jurisdiction because Van Komen did not take a polygraph test that may have incriminated him.  
State v. Van Komen, 376 P.3d 738, 744 (2016).  Although Van Komen analyzed a factually-
distinct situation, the legal framework set out in Van Komen (which is simply a summary of the 
well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedents applicable to penalty cases) is the same.  Van 
Komen therefore dictates the outcome here—Mr. Powell’s statements were taken in violation of 
his Fifth Amendment rights, and so the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress.   
Van Komen was on probation for possession of marijuana with the intent to deliver.  He 
admitted to violating his probation by spending time with a sixteen-year-old girl without his 
probation officer’s approval and by not taking drug tests.  Id. at 741.  The court then revoked 
Van Komen’s probation and retained jurisdiction.  Id.  As a condition of being placed back on 
probation at the end of his rider, the court ordered that Van Komen take a polygraph which 
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would ask about whether he had a sexual relationship with the sixteen-year-old girl and whether 
he had used drugs or alcohol.  Id.  Mr. Van Komen initially agreed to participate, but later 
refused.  Id.  At the rider review hearing, the court relinquished jurisdiction because Van Komen 
had not taken the polygraph.  Id. at 741–42. 
 On review from the Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the district 
court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction violated Van Komen’s Fifth Amendment right against 
self-incrimination.  Id. at 744.  The Court began by explaining two fundamental tenets of Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence:  First, the right applies to all proceedings, civil or criminal, so long as 
the answer might incriminate the defendant.  Id. at 742 (citing McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 
34, 40 (1924)); see also App. Br., p.9 (discussing the first part of the inquiry, whether there is a 
risk of incrimination).  Second, a liberty interest is not a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment 
right—instead, “any penalty for asserting the right to remain silent that [is] likely to compel an 
incriminating statement violates the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 743–44 (analyzing the plurality 
and concurring opinions in McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002)); see also App. Br., pp.9–11 
(discussing the second part of the inquiry, whether the penalty imposed amounts to compulsion).  
In other words, “‘our cases have established that a State may not impose substantial penalties 
because a witness elects to exercise his Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating 
testimony against himself.’”  Id. at 744 (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 
(1977)).1 
                                            
1 In response to the State’s argument that there is no Fifth Amendment violation unless the 
person actually answers the questions, the Van Komen Court explained that actually answering 
the questions may amount to a waiver of the privilege.  Van Komen, 376 P.3d at 742–43.  As 
explained in Mr. Powell’s appellant’s brief (App. Br., pp.7–8), however, this general rule is 
“inapplicable in cases where the assertion of the privilege is penalized so as to ‘foreclos[e] a free 
choice to remain silent, and . . . compe[l] . . . incriminating testimony,’” Minnesota v. Murphy, 
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 Applying these principles here, Mr. Powell’s statements were taken in violation of his 
Fifth Amendment rights and thus the court should have suppressed them.  First, the Fifth 
Amendment applied to his pre-parole interview and parole board hearing because Mr. Powell’s 
answers could have (and did actually) incriminate him.  See id. at 742.  Second, this case 
involved a penalty—losing his ability to be paroled and thus serving an additional nine years in 
prison—which compelled Mr. Powell’s statements.  See id. at 743–44; 10/8/14 Tr., p.14, L.1–
p.15, L.2; R., pp.60, 65, 74.  Therefore, the district court should have suppressed Mr. Powell’s 
statements and their fruits.   
B. The State’s Arguments Rest On Its Misunderstanding Of The Applicable U.S. Supreme 
Court Precedent And The Record, And Therefore Fail 
 
As an initial matter, the State’s argument that Mr. Powell’s claim fails because he chose 
to seek parole misunderstands the very meaning of compulsion.  (See Resp. Br., pp.6–7.)  As the 
U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, a “choice” is no choice at all when a penalty severe enough 
to compel the defendant is attached to that “choice.”  See, e.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 
420, 434–39 (1984).  Indeed, the State’s argument is incompatible with the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s decision in Van Komen.  Mr. Powell could have chosen not to seek parole, much like 
Van Komen could have chosen not to seek probation.  That Van Komen sought probation and 
was ordered to participate in the polygraph is similar to Mr. Powell seeking parole and being 
ordered to disclose all of his victims.  In both cases, the defendants had to “choose” between 
giving up a chance at their freedom and incriminating themselves.  Despite that fact, the 
Van Komen Court concluded that the district court violated Van Komen’s Fifth Amendment 
rights by relinquishing jurisdiction when he refused to incriminate himself.  See Van Komen, 376 
                                                                                                                                            
465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984) (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 661 (1976) (omissions 
and alterations in original)).  
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P.3d at 744.  Similarly here, and despite the fact that Mr. Powell “chose” to seek out parole, his 
statements were taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment precisely because of the penalty 
attached to that choice—if he did not incriminate himself, he would spend an additional nine 
years in prison.  (See 10/8/14 Tr., p.14, L.1–p.15, L.2; R., pp.60, 65, 74.) 
For similar reasons, the State’s reliance on Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, 
523 U.S. 272 (1998), is misplaced.  In Woodard, the U.S. Supreme Court held that giving a 
defendant the option of a voluntary clemency interview did not violate the Fifth Amendment.  Id. 
at 285–88.  Importantly, Woodard was an adverse inference case—Woodard would still be 
eligible for clemency regardless of whether he participated in a clemency interview, but the 
clemency board could consider Woodard’s silence in making its determination without running 
afoul of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 286.  This case, however, is a penalty case—Mr. Powell’s 
silence would mean he would not be paroled, and so that penalty compelled his statements.  
(10/8/14 Tr., p.14, L.1–p.15, L.2; R.p.65.)  The holding in Woodard is therefore inapplicable.        
Next, the State’s analysis of McKune mistakenly relies on the plurality opinion (which it 
fails to denote as such and misleadingly labels “the Court”), and says nothing about the opinion 
that in fact controls—Justice O’Connor’s concurrence.  (See Resp. Br., pp.8–10; see also App. 
Br., p.13.)  Because the State’s arguments rely on reasoning rejected by Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring and controlling opinion, they are irrelevant.  (See App. Br., pp.9, 12–19.)  For the 
reasons discussed in Mr. Powell’s appellant’s brief, Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion 
shows that the district court should have suppressed Mr. Powell’s statements.  (See id.) 
Finally, the State’s attempt to assert that Mr. Powell waived any challenge to the 
statements he made to the Attorney General investigators because he failed to argue that the 
statements he made to them were fruits of his previous disclosures during the pre-parole 
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interview and parole board hearing ignores the undisputed facts and the State’s own admissions.  
(See Resp. Br., p.11 n.3 (citing State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).)  As undisputedly 
shown in the record (R., pp.77, 98; 10/8/14 Tr., p.20, Ls.7–19), discussed in the appellant’s brief 
(App. Br., pp.2–3), and acknowledged by the State below (R., p.102), the investigators 
interviewed Mr. Powell because of the disclosures he made during his pre-parole interview and 
parole board hearing.  As the State explained in its response to Mr. Powell’s motion to suppress:   
In preparation for [the parole] hearing, Pre-Board Hearing Officer, Diana 
Carnell, interviewed Defendant.  It was at this meeting where Defendant initially 
disclosed that he had sexually abused two (2) additional minor children, his 
biological sons S.M.A. and J.W.A.  Defendant then proceeded into the Parole 
Board Hearing and made the same disclosures in that open proceeding.  
Subsequently, Carnell reported this disclosed sex crime as required by 
law.  She contacted the jurisdictional agency where the crime was alleged to have 
been committed: the Post Falls Police Department. Detective Uhrig in turn 
contacted Jim Kouril, an Investigator with the Idaho Attorney General’s office 
and requested a law enforcement interview with Defendant.  On November 15, 
2013, Kouril conducted a formal interview of Defendant at the South Idaho 
Correctional Institute (SICI). 
 
(R., pp.101–02 (emphasis added).)  That Mr. Powell did not “argue, much less establish” the 
obvious, unchallenged, and already admitted fact that the investigators interviewed Mr. Powell 
because they were asked to so by Post Falls Police, after Ms. Carnell reported Mr. Powell’s 
disclosures to the Post Falls Police, could not amount to a waiver.  The State’s suggestion that 
Mr. Powell should be required to argue factually-undisputable issues which the State already 
conceded below is meritless.  
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Powell faced a classic penalty situation during his parole-related interviews.  He 
either had to incriminate himself or forego parole.  That penalty—spending another nine years in 
prison rather than having the opportunity to be paroled—was sufficient to compel Mr. Powell to 
incriminate himself.   Those incriminating statements were ultimately used against him, resulting 
in his conviction and incarceration in this case.  Because Mr. Powell’s statements were taken in 
violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress.  He respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and reverse the district 
court’s order denying his motion to suppress. 
 DATED this 17th day of November, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of November, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a copy 
thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
GREGORY W POWELL 
4025 PATRICIA LN  
BOISE ID 83704 
 
FRED M GIBLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
  
DOUGLAS A PIERCE 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN  
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
MPW/eas 
 
